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Inviting the Barbarians. Some Episodes of Treason 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper analyses a specific accusation made against men and women of power that appears in 
several late antique sources. The accusation is that they secretly incited barbarian enemies to invade the Roman empire. 
This kind of treason is usually attributed to historical figures who sought revenge against domestic enemies, to defeat a 
usurper, or eliminate a legitimate emperor. The individuals accused of such treacherous “invitations” are emperors 
(Constantius II), women of the court or Augustae (Serena, Honoria, Licinia Eudoxia), eunuchs (Hyacinthus, Narses), 
and public enemies (Rufinus, Stilicho, Bonifatius). These episodes should not, however, be regarded as a literary 
invention. In fact, they manifest the recurring desire among contemporaries to identify and punish scapegoats. These 
stories show, above all in the Theodosian age, how diplomatic relations with the barbarians were a delicate matter. 
These accusations of complicity with the barbarians were a means to demonise internal enemies.  
 
1) A “serial” traitor: Constantius II 
A very particular military strategy is twice attributed to Emperor Constantius II (Augustus from 
337 to 361 AD), first in the war against the usurper Magnentius, then in the conflict against his own cousin 




As some sources from the fourth and fifth centuries record, Constantius incited the Germans to 
rebel against Magnentius
2
 in around 352
3
. Among these, Zosimus’ New History is the only source 
documenting that Constantius distributed large quantities of money to the barbarians living near the Rhine, 
on the understanding that they would join his fight against the usurper (2.53.3). 
A far more recurrent element in the accounts of the alleged invitation, however, is the presence of 
letters that attested Constantius’ agreement with the Germans. Libanius mentions the imperial letters that 
allowed the Germans to break through the Roman borders and occupy as much land as they could (Or. 
18.33). Of course, those referred to as “barbarians” are very often actually troops at the disposal of Roman 
generals. As paid barbarian allies, the Germans were available to fight on the emperor’s behalf when 
requested. 
Other sources show that these letters, far from being the instrument of a secret operation, were a 
kind of official authorisation for them to settle in the Roman lands. As Libanius and Sozomenus record, the 
Germans were able to produce them as evidence of their right to occupy these territories, when Julian later 
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proceeded to free these lands from the Germans and give them back to the Gallo-Roman population
4
. 
Moreover, according to Sozomenus, Julian used these letters as proof of Constantius’ treason. Julian 
presumably did this with the intent of strengthening his own precarious position of illegitimately elected 
Augustus: Sozomenus stresses this aspect, highlighting that he deliberately made the letters public, or in a 
deceptive way (ἐπίτηδες, 5.1.2). Considering that elsewhere Sozomenus mentions the letters that bore 
witness to Constantius’ permission for the Germans to occupy the Roman lands in Gaul, without expressing 
any doubt about their actual existence
5
, it is clear that the adverb ἐπίτηδες does not suggest that the letters 
shown by Julian were a forgery. In fact, Sozomenus infers that Julian used them deceitfully out of context. In 
other words, Julian presented Constantius as a traitor, while Constantius, who had to choose between the 
barbarians and a usurper, was simply opting for the necessary evil – namely, the barbarians
6
.  
The fact that external enemies could be considered to be the lesser evil compared to usurpers is not 
surprising. At least one similar episode is recorded: in the last months of Stilicho’s hegemony, Stilicho was 
ready to send Alaric against the usurper Constantine III
7
. As a consequence of Stilicho’s death in 408 AD, 
the plan was soon aborted. However, this is a significant piece of evidence of the great lengths people of 
power might be willing to go to in order to eliminate those who threatened the imperial maiestas
8
. 
As other sources claim, Constantius exploited this kind of military operation again as he had to deal 
with another usurper – Julian, who had newly been proclaimed Augustus by his troops in Lutetia Parisiorum 
(in 360 AD)
9
. This time, it is possible to clearly identify the original source upon which later literary 
evidence draws: the writings of Emperor Julian himself. It is Julian who first states, in his Letter to the 
Athenians (361 AD), that the Germans were sent against him by his cousin
10
. As in the previous operations 
against Magnentius, money seems to have played a prominent role in the dealings between Constantius and 
the Germans. As Julian argues, his cousin paid them to pillage Gaul
11
, while according to Libanius, 
Constantius incited many people to attack Julian by giving them large quantities of money
12
.  
Another recurrent element, also present in the previous treason by Constantius, is the focus in these 
sources, with Julian being the first, on the material evidence of the treachery – that is, the letters sent by 
Constantius to his enemies. Julian claims to have received from the barbarians themselves the letters that 
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 LIB., Or. 18.52; SOZ. 5.2.22. 
5
 See the already referenced passage SOZ. 5.2.22. 
6
 This may also confirm F. Heim’s idea that Constantius was less aggressive towards the Germans than Julian was: see 
HEIM (1992), p. 289-292. 
7
 ZOS. 5.31.4-6. See also O’FLYNN (1983), p. 56. 
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 According to ROBERTO (2012), p. 122, even after Stilicho’s death, Honorius and Flavius Constantius gave priority to 
the elimination of the usurpers over the solution of the problem with the Goths. See also DOYLE (2019), p. 131, with a 
reference to OROS., Hist. 7.42.1. This passage supports the idea that Honorius wanted the usurpers to be suppressed first 
and then the barbarian enemies.  
9
 The sources that record the second “invitation” are JUL., ad Ath. 286a-b; LIB., Or. 18.107, 13.35; AMM. 21.3.4-5; 
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invitation to northern barbarians, which however do not specify which of the two invitations they are dealing with: JUL., 
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Constantius sent them (while also intercepting the letters of Taurus, the praetorian prefect of Italy and 
Africa
13
). Julian also highlights that this is clear evidence of what might otherwise seem like unreliable 
accusations
14
. Libanius also mentions the letters that Constantius sent to the barbarians on his second 
“invitation”
15
. During the preparations for the civil war between the two cousins, as shown before, Julian 
made Constantius’ letters to the Germans public, in order to persuade as many troops as possible to join him. 
As Libanius writes, “The letters written to the barbarians by the coward traitor were very useful to him (i.e. 
Julian): as he sailed and marched, he read them aloud to the cities and to the military camps, and compared 
his own deeds to these excellent letters. These letters motivated the audience to fight against Constantius, 
and made them Julian’s allies, although Julian led an army that was much smaller than that of Constantius”
16
. 
The same use of Constantius’ letters is later documented by Socrates Scholasticus
17
.  
These sources do not specify whether the letters made public by Julian were those sent by 
Constantius to the Germans in order to prompt them to attack Magnentius, or those sent in order to damage 
Julian’s position. An exception is the passage (cited above) in which Sozomenus says that Julian deceitfully 
took advantage of the letters sent in order to weaken Magnentius (5.1.2). This does not rule out, however, 
that Julian also included the letters related to the second treason (i.e. the one putting Julian himself in 
distress) in the dossier which had to be read aloud in the cities of Gaul. This could be confirmed by the fact 
that, in the initial phase of the civil war, at least in the Letter to the Athenians, Julian made public the 
accusation that Constantius had provoked the attack of the Germans against him. In general, Julian did not 
spare any criticism against Constantius in texts that he distributed in many parts of the Empire. Thus, when 
the Roman senators read a speech of this kind, which Julian sent them during the civil war (361 AD), he 
seemed ungrateful towards his cousin Constantius
18
. 
The most detailed account of Constantius’ second alleged treason was written by Ammianus. First 
of all, the Antiochene historian is more precise about the actors involved, and about which Germanic peoples 
connived with Constantius. It was Vadomarius, the King of the Alamanni, who was the accomplice of the 
senior Augustus. “If rumours can be trusted”, explains Ammianus, “Constantius wrote to Vadomarius to start 
immediately pillaging the bordering lands near to him, as if the agreement of concord had been broken, so 
that Julian, afraid of this, could not abandon the defence of Gaul to go anywhere else”
19
. After implying that 
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these rumours may be false
20
, Ammianus recounts that Julian first managed to catch a notarius carrying a 
letter sent by Vadomarius to Constantius
21
, and then caught the chieftain of the Alamanni himself
22
. 
Zosimus does not record this new episode of treason committed by Constantius. However, this is 
not surprising: compared to Ammianus Marcellinus, Eunapius’ History (Zosimus’ source) adheres far less to 
Julian’s account, for example in the narrative of Julian’s dealings with the Salian Franks
23
. On the other 
hand, Ammianus does not deal with the invitation (mentioned in Zosimus’ New History) that Constantius 
allegedly sent to the barbarians to attack Magnentius.  
One might wonder whether the repetition of this “invitation” on two different occasions is actually 
the result of a duplication of the same episode in the sources. However, contemporary sources clearly state 
that Constantius used this strategy twice. This is reported not only by Libanius (“Constantius resorted again 
to the same trick, by inciting the barbarians through letters”, Or. 18.107), but also by Julian, whose work is 
the original source of the accusations (“Constantius abandoned Gaul twice to the enemies”, ad Ath. 287a).    
2) The making of a rumour 
Among similar episodes of “invitation”, Stilicho’s case is, in my opinion, the one that shows in the 
clearest and most detailed way how these rumours originated and evolved. When the magister utriusque 
militiae Stilicho was beheaded on 22 August, 408 AD, at least two charges had been brought against him. On 
the one hand, he was accused of plotting against the Emperor – Honorius, according to some sources, or the 
young Theodosius II, according to others – and trying to have his son, Eucherius, step into the Emperor’s 
shoes
24
. On the other hand, the more official accusation made against him was of having used money to 
“enrich and incite” the barbarians. The latter accusation appears to be the more official of the two charges, 
since it was mentioned in a law later included in the Theodosian Code
25
. As time passed, however, literary 
sources began to record further reasons behind his fall. According to Orosius, he had also incited the Alans, 
the Suebi, and the Vandals to cross the Rhine and invade Gaul. With the western provinces in distress, 
Stilicho could have easily managed to proclaim Eucherius the new Emperor
26
.  
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 AMM. 21.3.5, si dignum est credere. 
21
 AMM. 21.3.5. Of course, this letter should not be confused with Constantius’ invitation letter mentioned just above; 
see THOMPSON (1943), p. 84-85. 
22
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 AMM. 17.8.3-5; EUN., fr. 10 FHG = 18.1 BLOCKLEY; ZOS. 3.6.3; cf. JUL., ad Ath. 280a-b. In Eunapius and Zosimus’ 
accounts Julian appeases the Salian Franks; in Julian and Ammianus’ accounts, on the other hand, Julian defeats them. 
24
 According to Sozomenus (9.4.1, cf. 9.4.7) and Zosimus (5.32.1), Stilicho tried to let his son take Theodosius II’s 
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WINKELMANN; MARCELL., Chron. (Th. MOMMSEN, Chron. Min. II) p. 69 s.a. 408; JORD., Rom. 322. See F. 
PASCHOUD’s commentary to ZOS. 5.32.3, note 71. BURNS (1994), p. 221 argues that Stilicho wanted to let his son take 
the place of Theodosius II, rather than that of Honorius.  
25
 Opes (…) quibus ille usus est ad omnem ditandam inquietandamque barbariem (COD. THEOD. 9.42.22 of 22 
November 408). See CRACCO RUGGINI (1968), p. 433; BROCCA (2005), p. 139. See also MAZZARINO (1990), p. 204, 208 
and VÁRADY (1968) for the accusations made against Stilicho by his contemporaries.  
26
 OROS., Hist. 7.38.3-4, cf. 7.40.3. See O’FLYNN (1983), p. 25-62; BURNS (1994), p. 183-223; MCEVOY (2013), p. 153-
186 for the wider military and diplomatic context of these events.  
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In the sixth century, Count Marcellinus was probably harking back to Orosius when he wrote that 
Stilicho incited these tribes to invade Honorius’ part of the Empire in order to extort from Honorius the 
position of Caesar for his son Eucherius
27
. Marcellinus’ Chronicle adds a new element to Orosius’ story: 
Stilicho incited the Alans, Suebi, and Vandals to attack the pars imperii that belonged to Honorius by 
offering them gifts and money (donis pecuniisque inlectas … excitauit). There are no sources before 
Marcellinus that specify the means by which Stilicho persuaded these barbarian nations to rise up. Thus, it is 
legitimate to argue that Marcellinus probably had no additional information regarding exactly how Stilicho 
gained the barbarians’ alliance, and thus he might have hypothesised that it was a pecuniary agreement. 
Decades later, Gregory of Tours even accused Stilicho of being the military leader of those barbarians who 
invaded Gaul
28
.     
That Stilicho incited the Alans, Suebi, and Vandals to invade the western Roman provinces may 
simply have been a hypothesis on Orosius’ part; or perhaps Orosius knew of rumours that are not attested by 
earlier literary sources. In any case, one can easily guess the reason behind this invention: Stilicho’s 
numerous negotiations with Alaric, King of the Visigoths, could be perceived as an indication of his 
willingness to enter into secretive arrangements with Germanic soldiers in order to strengthen his own 
position – in this case to gain Illyricum for the western part of the Empire
29
. Therefore, because of Stilicho’s 
allegedly treacherous personality, a betrayal on Stilicho’s part could be seen as the real cause of the 
traumatic invasion of Gaul on the eve of the year 407. This attitude towards the unfortunate Roman general 
mirrors the official accusation against him of having “enriched and incited” the barbarians, and is well 
represented not only by Saint Jerome, but also by Rutilius Namatianus, who famously described him as 
proditor arcani imperii
30
. Orosius, Marcellinus, and Gregory of Tours simply elaborated upon the official 
accusation, which was formulated shortly after Stilicho’s death.  
Thus, while the accusation of collusion with the Alans, Suebi, and Vandals may be a later 
speculation, the charge of negotiating with Alaric originated from the actual relations between Stilicho and 
Alaric. Stilicho saw Alaric’s barbarians as a military potential that should not be wasted. Rather, this 
potential should be exploited for ambitious campaigns, such as the conquest of Illyricum, and the 
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 MARCELL., Chron. (MOMMSEN, Chron. Min. II) p. 69 s.a. 408, Stilico comes (…) spreto Honorio regnumque eius 
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overthrowing of the usurper Constantine III
31
. This attitude derived from the scarcity of soldiers which 
weakened the western Roman empire at the time
32
.  
It is worth noting that the accusation against Stilicho of trying to usurp the supreme power and give 
it to Eucherius are first recorded just few years after Stilicho and Eucherius’ death. Orosius, who reports this 
accusation, wrote his Historiae aduersus paganos only a decade after this event. Zosimus’ New History, 
which also mentions the accusation, depends, for this period, on Olympiodorus, a well-informed historian. 
Zosimus also reports that if Alaric had reached Eucherius before Stilicho’s enemies could kill him, Eucherius 
would have survived
33
. Finally, the law quoted by Codex Theodosianus 9.42.22, promulgated just three 
months after Stilicho’s execution, while highlighting the complicity with the Goths as the main cause of 
Stilicho’s fall, also implies that his son Eucherius was condemned along with him
34
. The accusation of a 
secret, treasonable agreement with the Goths, and the charge of a planned usurpation in favour of Eucherius, 
may well have been combined together in public opinion, soon after – or even shortly before – Stilicho’s 
demise. 
Interestingly, it was not only Stilicho who was accused of “inviting” the barbarians: so were some 
of his contemporaries – both his allies and his enemies. After Stilicho’s death, while Alaric besieged Rome 
in late 408 AD, Stilicho’s wife Serena was accused of inciting Alaric’s Visigoths to invade the city, for 
which she was put to death. Zosimus’ New History is the only source of this charge. This section of the work 
derives largely from Olympiodorus of Thebes. Zosimus states that this suspicion was false: Serena never 
tried to abandon the Eternal City to the enemies. In any case, according to Zosimus her punishment was well 
deserved, since she, a devout Christian, committed blasphemy against the traditional gods. Zosimus also 
gives details of who were responsible for this fatal slander: the senators of Rome and Serena’s cousin, Galla 
Placidia
35
. Since Stilicho’s followers began to be persecuted shortly after his death, the most plausible 
explanation for this turn of events is that the senators and Galla Placidia’s intention was to get rid of one of 
the last survivors of the purge: Serena.  
It is possible that the idea of a connection between Serena and Alaric originated from the fact that 
Alaric and the barbarian troops billeted in Italy were unsettled by the fall of Stilicho’s regime. Thus, they 
may have been suspected of trying to restore the survivors of the coup to power. As already shown, had it 
been possible, Alaric would probably have saved Eucherius’ life. In addition, after the fall of Stilicho, the 
women and children of barbarian soldiers were massacred in various Italian cities. The soldiers thus decided 
to join Alaric in order to avenge them
36
. Putting Serena to death could be seen as a means to weaken the 
former supporters of Stilicho, who now supported Alaric
37
. 
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Zosimus’ firm denial of this rumour parallels his own stance towards the magister scrinii 
Olympius
38
. He claims that Olympius disseminated the idea that Stilicho was planning to have Theodosius II 
killed and his own son Eucherius put in his place
39
. Zosimus condemns Olympius, and his work is, along 
with Olympiodorus’ History, the only eastern source that paints Stilicho in a positive light
40
. However, it is 
probable that the explanation of Serena’s death that Zosimus records had actually circulated in the Senate. As 
a matter of fact, Olympiodorus’ History, upon which Zosimus draws, is an excellent source. Olympiodorus 
wrote his History in the first half of the fifth century
41
. He was generally well informed about the recent 
history of the West and was not a reclusive historian, having travelled as an ambassador on behalf of 
Theodosius II since the 410s (though mainly in the East). It would thus be wrong to consider the accusation 
he reports as a mere hypothesis or invention. It documents the search for a scapegoat that took place among 
the Roman elites during the distressing siege of the city by the Visigoths
42
.  
Scapegoating is common in the cases examined in this paper. It is tantamount to personalising 
complex events and reducing them to simplistic narratives
43
. The accusation that Malalas makes against 
Honorius of having invited Alaric to Rome to fight against the Senate is another result of this search for a 
person responsible for calamities, in this case the sack of Rome of 410
44
. This interpretation of the capture of 
Rome probably arises from Honorius’ lack of commitment to save Rome. This emerges from Honorius’ 
refusal of all the moderate offers of peace by Alaric, as reported by Zosimus
45
, and is also reflected by the 
famous tale according to which Honorius was more worried about his hen named Rome than about the city 
itself
46
. However, Malalas’ criticism may also originate from Honorius’ genuine hostility towards the Roman 
Senate. Indeed, Priscus Attalus, who usurped imperial power in Rome from 409 to 410 AD, was an eminent 
member of the senatorial aristocracy
47
. In addition to Honorius, another scapegoat was found for Alaric’s 
sack of Rome. The noblewoman Anicia Faltonia Proba was said to have opened the gates of the Eternal City 
to the enemies in order to save the Romans from starving to death
48
.  
These kinds of rumours also highlight the unresolved relationship between the Romans and the 
Gothic armies, whose political importance was then growing. Accusing someone of connivance with the 
Goths might have been a strong political weapon at the time. It is thus unsurprising that both Stilicho and his 
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political enemy Rufinus were accused of the same action: inviting the barbarians to enter the Roman 
territories
49
. Rufinus was the praetorian prefect of the East from 392 until his violent death in 395 AD
50
. In 
the first half of 395, Rufinus managed to get Alaric’s Visigoths to stop besieging Constantinople
51
. In the 
summer of 395, Stilicho led his troops in Greece against Alaric. His campaign against the Visigoths was 
interrupted by Rufinus, who ordered him to retreat to the West and send the eastern soldiers back to the 
East
52
. In November 395, however, Rufinus was lynched and killed in the outskirts of Constantinople by the 
same soldiers that he had recalled
53
. The uncertain and volatile military situation, and in particular the 
scarcity of details as to how Rufinus dissuaded Alaric from the siege of Constantinople, may have aroused 
suspicion against him. This suspicion may have been exploited by Stilicho and his supporters for their own 
political agenda. 
Both western and eastern sources accuse Rufinus of colluding with the Goths
54
. In his in Rufinum, 
Claudian describes the invasion of Illyricum by the Visigoths as follows: “He (Rufinus) pushes the Goths 
and the peoples of the Hister to set off; he welcomes the Scythians (Scythiamque receptat) so that they can 
help him, and delivers the remnants of his army to the hostile soldiers”
55
. And further: “That said, he 
(Rufinus) broke the barriers – as if Aeolus loosened the winds’ reins – and thus spread the peoples, and 
opened the path to war”
56
. This is not dissimilar from the texts that accuse his arch-enemy Stilicho of inciting 
the barbarians to attack the Romans
57
. The same set of accusations is bounced back and forth from the East 
to the West, and is used to criticise both Stilicho and Rufinus. However, Rufinus and Stilicho, being the 
ambitious regents of Arcadius and Honorius, respectively, are presented as similar characters by Eunapius of 
Sardis, and hence by Zosimus, who draws upon Eunapius for this part of his New History
58
.  
That similar accusations were used against both Stilicho and Rufinus is confirmed by eastern 
sources that highlight Rufinus’ role in the Gothic invasion of Illyricum. Zosimus, who relies on Eunapius 
here, writes that Rufinus secretly informed Alaric that he had permission to enter Thrace, Macedonia, and 
Thessaly along with his barbarians
59
. On the other hand, John of Antioch combines this “invitation” with the 
accusation, generally made against Rufinus, of trying to usurp imperial power in the East
60
. According to 
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ROBERTO = 215 MARIEV. Rufinus is also said to have provoked his rival Promotus’ death by sending the barbarians 
against him: see ZOS. 4.51.3. See O’FLYNN (1983), p. 27 for these accusations.  
55
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56
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57
 COD. THEOD. 9.42.22, inquietandamque barbariem; HIER., Epist. 123.16, ed. J. LABOURT, scelere semibarbari accidit 
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58
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59
 ZOS. 5.5.4-5. 
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John, Rufinus frightened the emperor Arcadius through his own friendship with the barbarians, and forced 
him to share with him the position of eastern emperor. Rufinus later introduced a multitude of barbarians led 
by Alaric into eastern Roman lands, and had Greece and Illyricum pillaged by them. As a consequence, it 
became clear that he was attempting some kind of usurpation of imperial power (τυραννίς)
61
.  
Why is it so clear to John of Antioch that the act of provoking an invasion by the barbarians served 
as a means for a usurpation?
62
 It seems to have been a relatively common way of explaining the faults of a 
public enemy, as is shown by another example of such behaviour. A parallel is to be found in the very case 
of Stilicho. Orosius, as seen above, stated that Stilicho tried to obtain the empire for his son from Honorius 
by means of a barbarian invasion
63
. Marcellinus wrote that Stilicho “provoked the peoples of the Alans, 
Suebi, and Vandals to attack the empire of Honorius, out of contempt towards Honorius, and because he was 
trying to gain hold of his empire”
64
. The tactics are the same: threatening an emperor with a Germanic 
invasion, then usurping the empire – with the small difference that Stilicho tried to do that on behalf of his 
son Eucherius.  
3) Traitors and barbarians 
The action attributed to Constantius II, although controversial, came from a legitimate ruler. What 
if an “invitation” was made by a usurper or a public enemy? The comes Africae, Bonifatius, is rarely defined 
as a usurper, and, in any case, becoming a usurper is presented more as an intention than as a matter of fact
65
. 
However, Bonifatius was declared hostis publicus by the magister utriusque militiae Felix in 427 AD. Felix 
considered Bonifatius to be too powerful, and thus sent a Roman army against him, which was defeated by 
Bonifatius in that same year
66
. Several sources state that Bonifatius negotiated with the Vandals (circa 428-
429 AD) as a reaction to the conspiracy plotted against him by Aetius, who managed to influence Galla 
Placidia’s attitude towards him
67
. Among these accounts, the most detailed are those written by Procopius 
and Theophanes – the latter evidently drawing from the former. These two historians record that Bonifatius 
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 In two episodes that I have already analysed, on the contrary, the Germans are incited by a legitimate emperor 
(Constantius II) to destroy usurpers (Magnentius, Julian). A later case of an “invitation” to the barbarians against a 
usurper is that of Licinia Eudoxia and Genseric’s alliance against Petronius Maximus. 
63
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magister utriusque militiae in 425-430. 
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 PROCOP., Vand. 1.3.22-26; JORD., Get. 167, Rom. 330; JO. ANT., fr. 196 FHG = 290 ROBERTO (spurium according to 
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sent his most faithful friends to Spain in order to gain the support of the Vandals, or that he went in person to 
Spain to the Vandals
68
.  
Bonifatius’ “invitation” could have been considered plausible by contemporaries. Warlords could 
have special relations of trust with certain barbarian nations. This allowed the warlords to recruit barbarians 
into the Roman army with relative ease. As Aetius had strong personal connections with the Huns, 
Bonifatius could be considered to have established similar relations with the Vandals
69
. My main aim, 
however, is to understand when this tradition first originated
70
. This is particularly difficult, since the notion 
of Bonifatius’ treason first emerges in the sources a century after the events, in Procopius and Jordanes’ 
accounts. Hydatius’ Chronicle, probably written between 457 and 468, and in any case before 470, does not 
record this accusation
71
, nor does (as far as we know) Olympiodorus of Thebes, who writes his History in the 
first half of the fifth century and has a high opinion of Bonifatius
72
. Prosper makes an allusion to a host of the 
barbarians (gentes) who did not have the competence necessary for sailing and were allowed to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea in 427, after the defeat of the first army that was sent by Felix against Bonifatius
73
. 
However, as J. Wijnendaele has demonstrated, this is hardly strict evidence of Bonifatius’ supposed 
invitation to the Vandals, as gentes may also refer to the Visigoths engaged by Felix in the conflict between 
him and Bonifatius
74
. Finally, there is no positive evidence that Cassiodorus had any role in the making of 
the tradition regarding Bonifatius’ treason
75
.  
Thus, it seems reasonable to opt for the idea that Bonifatius’ “invitation” to the Vandals emerged 
decades after the actual invasion of Africa by the Vandals in 429. However, one last aspect should be taken 
into account. The written sources that blame Bonifatius for the Vandal invasion are the works of Procopius, 
Jordanes, John of Antioch and Theophanes. These are all narratives that used Priscus of Panion’s History as 
a source
76
. It is possible that the first author who reported rumours of Bonifatius’ “invitation”, or 
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independently interpreted the Vandal invasion as the result of such a treason, was Priscus in the 470s. In this 
case, Bonifatius’ alleged treachery first appeared in a written source much earlier than Procopius and 
Jordanes; what is more, the memory of the Vandal invasion may still have been very much alive at the time 
Priscus was writing. In addition, putting the blame on Bonifatius for the invasion would be consistent with 
Priscus’ generally negative opinion of this warlord
77
.  
Justa Grata Honoria was apparently deemed (circa 449 AD) to have had an affair with her 
procurator Eugenius and thus fell into disgrace. In order to cover up the scandal, she was then forced to 
marry Herculanus, a man of high rank
78
. Therefore, she took revenge by sending the eunuch Hyacinthus as a 
messenger to Attila. Through Hyacinthus she promised the King of the Huns a sum of money and sent him a 
ring, in order to exhort him to help her out of her distress
79
. This could also have been considered plausible 
by contemporaries. As Galla Placidia had had special connections with the Visigoths as a consequence of her 
marriage to Athaulf, Honoria’s betrothal to Attila was not an impossible eventuality
80
.  
The variations among the different sources are in this case more substantial. According to John of 
Antioch, the origin of Honoria’s disgrace was the fact that she was caught going to a secret meeting with her 
lover Eugenius, who was soon put to death
81
. These elements of the narrative are nowhere to be found in 
other accounts. The eunuch who served as a messenger is explicitly named (as Hyacinthus) only by John of 
Antioch
82
. On the other hand, the version of the story where Honoria had been left pregnant by Eugenius is 
only in Count Marcellinus’ account
83
. Even the kind of punishment that the Augusta underwent for her 
sexual behaviour is different in the various sources. Priscus and John of Antioch write that she was deprived 
of her imperial authority, while Marcellinus and Jordanes (Romana) report that she was expelled from the 
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imperial palace and sent to the eastern emperor Theodosius II
84
. Finally, according to Jordanes (Getica), she 
was forced to live in chastity and was held under custody by order of her brother Valentinian III
85
.  
Not unlike the accounts regarding the recovery of the letters proving Constantius II’s betrayal in 
favour of the barbarians, a piece of evidence for the treason plays a prominent role in the various versions of 
the story of Honoria and Attila. The “smoking gun” is, in this case, the ring sent by Honoria to the chieftain 
of the Huns. The first author to speak of this object is Priscus of Panion, according to whom Attila demanded 
half of the western Roman empire as the dowry of Honoria, whom he claimed to be betrothed to him. The 
ring served to Attila as proof (τεκμήριον) of the agreement
86
. This piece of evidence for the treason is also 
mentioned in a fragment of John of Antioch in which the eunuch Hyacinthus is presented as the messenger 
who brought to Attila not only Honoria’s ring, but also, as in similar cases, a sum of money
87
.  
The first source to contain this element, as already mentioned, is Priscus’ History. Note that this 
work was written in the 470s, just two or three decades after the alleged facts. Priscus seems to be reporting a 
rumour originating from the years in which Attila’s threat was very concrete, or from the following years, in 
which the memory of the metus Hunnicus was still strong. Priscus was not fond of this kind of court gossip. 
In fact, in the later episode involving Licinia Eudoxia and the Vandals, in John of Antioch’s version 
(drawing upon Priscus), the “invitation” is just one of the two explanations for the facts
88
. It is thus 
improbable that Priscus himself came up with Honoria’s “invitation”
89
. It is possible that among Roman 
people, the rumour of Honoria’s treason arose from the two following facts: Attila had demanded Honoria’s 
hand in marriage, and, meanwhile, Honoria had fallen into disgrace at court, for unclear reasons. This was 
excellent material for gossip. It is also probable that Attila himself was interested in exploiting this rumour, 




In any case, the importance of oral traditions should not be underestimated regarding this episode. 
Priscus, who was not only a historian but also a diplomat, may have collected them from his acquaintances in 
the course of his life. Finally, this story may have been generally accepted in eastern Roman historiography 
because it put the blame for Attila’s invasion of the West on the western court, thus concealing the 
responsibilities of the eastern government
91
.  
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According to some ancient sources, 26 years after their invasion of Africa, the Vandals under King 
Genseric were led again by a traitor into the Roman empire. This time, an Augusta was alleged to be 
responsible for the catastrophe, and the destination of the invaders was Rome itself. Licinia Eudoxia, the 
daughter of Theodosius II and widow of Valentinian III, was insinuated of provoking the second sack of 
Rome by the Vandals led by Genseric in 455 AD
92
. When Valentinian III was murdered by order of 
Petronius Maximus, who then usurped the supreme power, Licinia Eudoxia was forced to marry the usurper. 
However, she soon came up with an elaborate plan for revenge. She is said to have called on Genseric for 




This is the basic tale told by the sources. It appears with few and small variations in them. The 
evidence for the treason, for instance, is presented by two of these sources in a different way. Unlike other 
authors, Count Marcellinus stresses that Eudoxia incited Genseric by letters (epistulis). However, this may 
simply have been what Marcellinus imagined would be the simplest way for Eudoxia to have contacted the 
King of the Vandals
94
. Equally irrelevant is the small addition made to the story by Evagrius Scholasticus in 
his Historia Ecclesiastica. Eudoxia, writes Evagrius, invited Genseric by immediately sending him many 
gifts
95
. This might simply be an improvisation by Evagrius. A treason hardly works without a bit of 
corruption, and an already mentioned passage involving Stilicho, along with a passage regarding the eunuch 
Narses that we will analyse later, are just two of the many parallel cases of this typical behaviour
96
.   
Licinia Eudoxia’s “invitation” is first attested fifteen years at the latest after the Vandals sacked 
Rome, since it already appears in Hydatius’ Chronicle, which, as mentioned, was written in any case before 
470. Hydatius is careful to add that the tale might just be a wicked rumour (ut mala fama dispergit)
97
. Nor 
does John of Antioch present this rumour as the only and official version. In fact, he reports this rumour only 
after offering an explanation that Genseric invaded Italy because Aetius and Valentinian III, with whom he 
had made the previous peace treaty, were dead, and because Petronius Maximus was weak
98
.  
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The tradition according to which Licinia Eudoxia called on the Vandal Genseric for help is, 
according to S. Mazzarino, a “duplicate”, created by Roman public opinion, of the earlier episode of the 
invitation of Attila by Honoria, which is based on more solid historical grounds
99
. It is true that the tale of 
Honoria, like the one of Eudoxia, involves a vengeful princess, a forced marriage, and an external enemy. 
However, it is possible to offer a new window into the tale of Eudoxia’s treason. A duplicate is the product 
of an aseptic operation that cannot be done when the material the historian is dealing with is too “hot”. The 
first available source mentioning Eudoxia’s betrayal, however, is Hydatius’ Chronicle, which was written 
fifteen years at the latest after the Vandals sacked Rome – thus a recent and traumatic event
100
. Whoever first 
charged Eudoxia with treason was not playing on a literary invention. Was the accuser (or were the accusers) 
somewhat influenced by the previous rumour involving Honoria and Attila? This cannot be ruled out with 
certainty. However, it is more important to stress the fact that the accuser, or the accusers, were trying to 
interpret recent facts. Such an interpretation, though false, may have given rise to new facts. A simplistic or 
false narrative can influence public opinion. In other words, scapegoating is a historical matter. Explaining 
this case as a “duplicate” would thus be misleading.   
This view is further strengthened by the reevaluation of a passage written by John of Antioch 
regarding Eudoxia’s treason: fr. 201 FHG = 293.1 Roberto = 224 Mariev. When writing this passage, as U. 
Roberto has demonstrated, John was drawing upon Priscus of Panion’s historical work
101
. It is possible that 
this passage recalls another, relatively early, literary attestation of the gossip, since Priscus wrote his History 
in the 470s. Thus, the rumour of Eudoxia’s betrayal might have arisen around the time of the sack of Rome 
of 455, or not much later.    
The main explanation that Priscus (apud John of Antioch) offers for the Vandals’ sacking of Rome 
is that Genseric invaded Italy because Aetius and Valentinian III, with whom the previous agreement of 
peace between the Vandals and the Romans had been struck, were dead. Moreover, Petronius Maximus, who 
had become the western Roman emperor after Valentinian III’s murder, was in a very weak position. It is 
only after offering this line of reasoning, that Priscus reports the rumour (οἱ δέ φασι) that Eudoxia asked 
Genseric to avenge her. It is clear that Priscus is trying to balance the gossip by giving an explanation that is 
more plausible than a simple “invitation”. Hydatius had already presented the idea of Eudoxia’s treason with 
scepticism, as if it were a nasty rumour (ut mala fama dispergit)
102
. Unless both Hydatius and Priscus were 
drawing upon an earlier written source
103
, it is possible that, when they referred to Eudoxia’s invitation, they 
were simply reflecting an oral tradition.     
A final aspect that strengthens the idea that the rumours of Honoria and Eudoxia’s treason were 
part of the contemporary debate is the presence of the theme of kinship with the barbarians. This theme is 
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clearly not just a literary invention, as kinship was important leverage for both Attila and Genseric. Attila 
hoped to enlarge his empire, boost his finances, and increase his influence by marrying into the Theodosian 
dynasty
104
. In addition, the Vandals’ sacking of Rome may have been justified by the fact that Genseric’s son 
Huneric had been betrothed to Eudocia, daughter of Valentinian III, but the marriage had later been thwarted 
by Petronius Maximus
105
. Marriage thus seems to have been a crucial political instrument for those 
barbarians who were keen to gain a foothold in the Roman world
106
. On the other hand, kinship with the 
barbarians could explain why a Roman woman could call on the barbarians for help against domestic 
enemies. 
Charges of “invitations” are not limited to the fourth and fifth centuries. A later parallel can be 
found in a famous episode of Paulus Diaconus’ Historia Langobardorum, written in the late eighth century. 
As Paulus recounts, the Armenian eunuch Narses was accused of provoking the invasion of Italy by the 
Lombards in 568 AD by offering them the fruits and produce of the Italian lands
107
. Modern historians have 
debated whether this tale mirrors actual facts or is just a legend
108
. 
Although Paulus Diaconus offers the most detailed account of the alleged treason, the core of this 
tradition dates back much earlier. The Origo gentis Langobardorum, written in around 643, states that King 
Alboin led the Lombards into Italy, and that the Lombards had been invited by Narses
109
. Also in a section of 
the Liber Pontificalis that was written between 657 and 672, Narses is said to have incited the Lombards to 
conquer Italy
110
. In addition, Narses’ treachery is mentioned in Isidore of Seville’s Chronicle, in Prosperi 
Continuatio Hauniensis, and in Fredegar’s Chronicle, which date back to the early seventh century
111
. This 
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demonstrates that the first literary testimonies to this episode are not much later than the actual invasion of 
Italy by the Lombards
112
.  
It should be noted that Narses’ “invitation” is an exclusively western tradition, as it is only present 
in the Latin sources. It would also seem that the eastern sources had little interest in the Lombard conquest of 
Byzantine Italy
113
. The tradition of Narses’ treason, which originated in the Latin West, was soon accepted 
into the Lombard sources, starting from the Origo Gentis Langobardorum, probably because it justified the 
Lombards’ invasion of Italy
114
, or at least did not present it as a traumatic event
115
. It can thus be concluded 
that Narses’ invitation is not just a literary tradition; on the contrary, it was exploited both by the native 
population of Italy and by the Lombards as an explanation of their own recent history. 
4) Rumours and invention 
In all the cases examined, except perhaps for the episode of Bonifatius’ treason, sources can be 
found to demonstrate that the rumours of “invitations” arose at the same time as the events narrated – or 
slightly later. Generally speaking, these rumours cannot be considered to have simply been invented by 
historians. Nor should they be viewed as literary invention. They are rather the product of a search for a 
scapegoat among contemporaries. We are dealing with a kind of accusation that was circulating and being 
used within the political life of the later empire. It was reflected in literature only to a secondary and 
derivative degree. For example, it was accepted in historiography when it provided an effective narrative 
explaining complex historical developments, or was used by the historian to justify certain contexts or the 
actions of certain individuals
116
. The sources are thus reflecting live political debate and polemic, not using 
their own literary template to make sense of events. 
When people saw that something very serious had happened, they tried to figure out what the 
sovereigns and the people at court were responsible for. It would have been normal to surmise that 
untrustworthy people of power were behind the calamities. This may then have led people to accuse 
emperors perceived as being “bad” (Constantius II), alleged traitors and public enemies (Rufinus, Stilicho, 
Bonifatius?), and above all women (Serena, Honoria, Licinia Eudoxia) and eunuchs (Hyacinthus, Narses)
117
. 
Women were especially the object of suspicion in patriarchal Roman society. Charges of “invitations” are 
the product of common sense as perceived in the Roman world.  
Moreover, these rumours arise from different and clearly separate historical situations. 
“Invitations” are a matter of contemporary political debate, which may influence a military success or failure 
(Julian gained allies thanks to Constantius’ alleged treason), life or death (as with Stilicho and Serena). 
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Finally, at least in the episodes of Honoria and Eudoxia, we can postulate that the historians who recorded 
the rumours were to some extent relying on oral traditions. 
The common and basic element of the accounts examined is the idea that a domestic enemy has 
secretly negotiated with an external enemy. But this idea is not necessarily an attitude from late antiquity, 
since it is implicit in the universal concept of “traitor”
118
. Therefore, it is not only the presence of a common 
mental scheme that can explain the concentration of tales of secret arrangements with the barbarians in late 
antiquity. This phenomenon must also be explained by the existence of a common historical problem.  
Thus, after looking for a rhetorical or mental pattern in the accounts of “invitations”, we should 
identify the burning contemporary issue that provoked the search for scapegoats. As we have seen, these 
accusations are evidence of an unresolved relationship between the Romans and the barbarians. However, 
the barbarians are secondary players in these kinds of accounts. The aim of these accounts is to construct an 
internal enemy. It is traitors who put the healthy elements of society at risk. The external enemies, as 
portrayed in the works of Christian writers such as Salvian, are a neutral force; they can even contribute to 
the fall of cruel usurpers (for example, Petronius Maximus), although their main target is to ravage Roman 
lands. This search for a scapegoat is perhaps the reaction of a society unsettled by the problem of the 
presence of large numbers of barbarians both in the civilian and military contexts, and of their increasing 
power. Finding a domestic enemy guilty of complicity with them could help in the quest to find a way out of 
the predicament. Traitorous actions such as those examined may point to a negative behaviour, and to a level 
of wickedness that could not be disputed by anyone. The problematic relation between the Romans and the 
barbarians in the age from Stilicho to Licinia Eudoxia can explain why there were so many accusations at 
that time.  
We are not always aware of the identity of those who invented or spread these rumours, or of those 
who inflated the ambiguous attitudes of some historical figures. Olympius contributed to disseminating the 
idea that Stilicho was planning to make his son Eucherius emperor after having Theodosius II killed. Serena 
was accused of “inviting” Alaric by the Roman senators and Galla Placidia. As for the accusations made 
against Rufinus, one can suppose that Stilicho and his supporters played a large role in spreading them. In 
particular, Claudian made his audience and readers (presumably at court) aware of the treason attributed to 
Rufinus. We are dealing here with western elites. In addition, Attila used the notion of his betrothal to 
Honoria as a means to claim his rights on half of the western Roman empire
119
. On the other hand, John of 
Antioch, drawing upon Priscus, reports that “some people say” that Licinia Eudoxia invited Genseric to 
Rome. In all these cases, it is possible that the rumours are, at least partly, the outcome of opinion-making by 
interested individuals.  
Given the scarce amount of information regarding the oral sources of the historians taken into 
account in this paper, we cannot rule out a priori that even gossip from the lower strata of society could find 
its way into historiography. While analysing another controversial rumour (the alleged adoption of 
                                                     
118
 From the treason of Tarpeia, to that of Benedict Arnold, and endless other cases. 
119
 Finally, although this precedes the Theodosian age, it should be taken into account that Julian spread the notion of 
Constantius II’s invitation to the barbarians. 
18 
 
Theodosius II by Yazdegerd I), for instance, Agathias says: “This story is often told among us. It has been 
transmitted for a long time to the memory of the next generations, and until now it has been repeated among 
the notables and the people. However, I do not know this story because I found it reported in writings or 
historical works”
120
. As mentioned earlier, the importance of oral traditions should not be underestimated, 
particularly when it concerns traditions that came into being shortly after the events.  
It should now be clear that the rumours examined, whether true or not, should not be excluded from 
the study of history. In fact, they are genuine historical material. We will probably never know the extent to 
which Attila exploited the notion of Honoria’s proposal of marriage to him, as he led his army towards Italy. 
However, we do know that, at least according to Zosimus, Serena was falsely accused of helping Alaric to 
get into Rome, and was actually put to death for this. Even false rumours, such as the one related to Serena, 
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